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I. INTRODUCTION
1954 was a watershed year for racial equality. The Supreme Court,
in Brown v. Board of Education,' belatedly rejected the "separate but
equal doctrine" of Plessy v. Ferguson,2 as it pertained to public educa-
tion. The Brown Court held, "[we conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."4 In so doing, the Warren
Court attacked a system of apartheid that had its origins in the pre-civil
war south and was stamped with the approval of the Supreme Court in
Plessy.
Brown I, established a straightforward doctrine: dejure segregation
on the basis of race is, per se, a deprivation of the "equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 5 Yet, the Court
recognized that dismantling dual systems of education would not be
simple and, consequently, did not immediately announce a remedy.6
Because of the variety of conditions affecting each school district,
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The Court observed: "Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of
this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in
these cases presents problems of considerable complexity." Specifically, the Court requested the
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the Court remanded the cases to the courts of first instance,7 assigning
the federal district courts the task of desegregating the nation's
entrenched dual school systems.8 Brown I instructed the federal courts
to undertake this monumental task "guided by equitable principles,"
emphasizing "flexibility in shaping [their] remedies," and with a "facil-
ity for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."9 Further, the
lower courts were to ensure that the defendants complied "with all delib-
erate speed."10
Certainly, the Court's trepidation in fashioning a satisfactory rem-
edy is understandable. It is also understandable that local district courts
were viewed as better able to deal with the divergent situations that
affected minority students across the country.II However, in retrospect,
the intense criticism spawned by the Brown II decision is equally under-
standable 1-2forty-three years after Brown the effects of segregated
schools still confound communities and courts alike.
Regardless of one's view of the Brown II rationale, reality demands
that its deficiencies be acknowledged. Despite decades of doctrine
parties to present further argument on the two questions, numbered four and five, earlier
propounded by the Court:
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the
Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by
normal geographic school districting, negro children should forthwith be admitted to
schools of their choice, or
(b) May this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated school systems to a
system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in
question 4(b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to
frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of
this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in
arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees.
Id. at 494 n.13.
7. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown 11).
8. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1489 (2d ed. 1988).
9. 349 U.S. at 301.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 300-01.
12. See RICHARD H. SAYLER & BARRY B. BOYER, THE WARREN COURT: A CRIcAL
ANALYSIS 46, 52-57 (1969); HARRY R. RODGERS & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, Ill., LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES, Ch. 4 (1972); Alexander Bickel, The
Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964).
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attempting to chart the boundaries of district courts' remedial authority
to grant desegregation remedies, those boundaries remain far from clear.
The Rehnquist Court has inherited the desegregation dilemma from the
Burger and Warren Courts before it, and it too has struggled to find a
solution.
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Jenkins,'3 which
involved an effort begun in 1977 to desegregate the Kansas City, Mis-
souri schools. 4 After eighteen years, numerous appeals, and millions of
dollars spent on educational improvements, the Supreme Court was
asked to pass judgment on the propriety of two recent remedial orders of
the district court. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari' 5 to review
two questions:
1. Whether a remedial education desegregation program provid-
ing greater educational opportunities to victims of past de jure segre-
gation than provided anywhere else in the country nonetheless fails to
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment (thus precluding a finding of par-
tial unitary status) solely because student achievement in the district,
as measured by standardized test scores, has not risen to some
unspecified level?
2. Whether a federal court order granting salary increases to
virtually every employee of a school district-including non-instruc-
tional personnel-as part of a school desegregation remedy conflicts
with applicable decisions of this court which require that remedial
components must directly address and relate to the constitutional vio-
lation and be tailored to cure the condition that offends the
Constitution? 6
A majority of the Court reversed and ruled that the district court
had exceeded its remedial authority in ordering salary increases for vir-
tually all instructional and non-instructional staff.' 7 Further, the Court
held it was error to "requir[e] the State to continue to fund the quality
education programs because student achievement levels were still 'at or
below national norms at many grade levels.' 9"
8
This Note will examine in detail the Court's decision in Jenkins and
analyze the current status of desegregation. Part II is a historical survey
of desegregation jurisprudence; Part III details the procedural history
and factual background of Jenkins; Part IV analyzes the majority opin-
ion in Jenkins, and Part V will analyze the merits of the decision. Part
13. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
14. See id. at 2042.
15. See id. at 2041.
16. See id. at 2076.
17. See id. at 2055.
18. Id.
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VI will conclude by arguing that the Court's decision unnecessarily con-
strained the ability of district courts to redress the present effects of past
segregation.
II. DESEGREGATION JURISPRUDENCE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY
"In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our
great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one
white, the other black-but it is a course I predict, our people will ulti-
mately regret."' 9
Justice Marshall's somber observation was made in Milliken v.
Bradley,2" the first case in which the Supreme Court overruled a deseg-
regation decree. 2' More disturbingly, Milliken was also the first case in
which the Court "rationalized a segregated result in a case where a con-
stitutional violation had been found to exist."'22 Therefore, Milliken will
serve as a line of demarcation for our analysis: remedial authority was
expanded before it and has been contracted ever since.
A. Desegregation 1954-1973
Following Brown II, desegregation efforts faced strong opposition.
Desegregation faced two foes: the vague mandate of Brown II, and
fanatical racism.
Judicial confusion and resistance is best illustrated by Judge
Parker's reading of Brown II, after remand of Brown's companion case,
Briggs v. Elliot.23 In Briggs, Parker held that Brown did not require
integration, but "merely forbid the use of government power to enforce
segregation." 24
Considering the social climate of the South following Brown, the
delay in integration cannot be explained by the vagueness of Brown II,
alone. Evidence of the South's blatant defiance of Brown I is contained
in the Southern Manifesto.25 The Manifesto was a Congressional pledge
by Southern congressmen attacking the Court's decision in Brown I and
vowing to "use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this deci-
sion which is contrary to the Constitution."'26 The document was signed
by 101 Congressmen representing the states of the old Confederacy, and
was evidence that the gradual change anticipated by the "all deliberate
19. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Milliken 1) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. See id.
21. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1495.
22. Id.
23. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
24. Id. at 777.




speed" standard would not translate into increased acceptability.27
Faced with open hostility to integration and abuse of the "all delib-
erate speed" standard, the Court eventually was forced to demand
results. In Cooper v. Aaron,28 the Supreme Court asserted its supremacy
as the expositor of the Constitution, and demanded that offending school
districts comply with Brown L29 Following Aaron, the notion of "all
deliberate speed" became a demand for immediate results. 3° The Court
next moved to invalidate desegregation plans that, although facially neu-
tral, did not produce significant desegregation.31
Taking the offensive, the Court later approved sweeping remedial
power for the district courts. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,32 dis-
trict courts were encouraged to take "affirmative action in the form of
remedial altering of attendance zones.., to achieve truly nondiscrimina-
tory [student] assignments," and were authorized to use mathematical
ratios and busing to achieve desegregation.33 Thus, by 1971, the Court
had greatly bolstered the arsenal of the district courts in the fight to
desegregate. This trend, however, did not last.
B. Desegregation 1974-1994
In 1974, the Burger Court decided Milliken v. Bradley' which
marked the first decision of the Court to constrain efforts toward deseg-
regation. Milliken involved a district court's attempt to desegregate the
Detroit public school system. Although the suburban school districts
were found innocent of any constitutional violation, the district court
27. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 752 (1975).
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29. Cooper involved a district court order granting a two and one-half year suspension of a
school board's desegregation program. The district court's decision was granted amidst an
atmosphere of "extreme public hostility, which had been engendered largely by the official
attitudes and actions of the Governor and legislature .. " The district court and the school board
contended that following Governor Orville Faubus' blockade of desegregation, peace and order in
the schools could only be restored and maintained by delaying desegregation. Although the
situation was severe, the Supreme Court would not bow to public pressure admonishing the
district court that "law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of
their constitutional rights." Id. at 16, 19-21.
30. See, e.g., Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963)(holding the "all deliberate speed"
standard inapplicable to recreational facilities and questioning its validity in the context of school
desegregation).
31. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963)(invalidating a plan that
allowed students to transfer to schools where their race was a majority); Griffin v. County School
Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating school closures as a means of avoiding desegregation);
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating "freedom-of-choice" plan
because it had produced only token desegregation in its three years of operation),
32. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
33. Id. at 25, 28, 30-31.
34. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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ordered the fifty-three suburban districts surrounding metropolitan
Detroit to consolidate with the Detroit school system and mandated bus-
ing throughout the new district irrespective of former district lines.
3 5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rationalizing that "any less
comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in
an all-black system immediately surrounded by practically all-white sub-
urban school systems. 36
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because evidence of de
jure segregation was shown only with respect to the Detroit School sys-
tem "[tlo approve the remedy ordered.., would impose on the outlying,
districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a
wholly impermissible remedy. ' 37  Professor Tribe has noted that the
Milliken Court divided sharply over the proper reading of Swann. While
the majority confined the holding of Swann as seeking only to "restore
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct,"3 8 the minority, Justices Mar-
shall, Douglas, Brennan, and White, read Swann to require "that school
authorities must, to the extent possible, take all practicable steps to
ensure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together."
39
Thus, the Milliken majority granted the victims of unconstitutional seg-
regation a hollow remedy: admission to a unitary school system that was
in fact still segregated.
A later decision of the Court granted district courts a partial
reprieve from the constraints of Milliken. In Milliken v. Bradley II,4" the
Supreme Court allowed the district court to order educational enrich-
ment programs for the purpose of addressing the reduction in student
performance in the Detroit schools as a result of segregation."1
In 1976, the Court decided Washington v. Davis,42 which
announced that "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. 4 3 Thereafter, racial imbal-
35. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973).
36. Id.
37. 418 U.S. at 745.
38. TIUsE, supra note 8, at 1494 n.9.
39. 418 U.S. at 802.
40. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
41. Id. at 282. In the context of housing discrimination the Court did relax the demands of
Milliken allowing a metropolitan area remedy following a violation that was limited to the
Chicago city limits. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
42. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
43. Id. at 240. Davis involved a challenge to a verbal skills test used in hiring by the District
of Columbia police force. Blacks failed at a rate four times greater than whites. Black applicant's
challenged the tests claiming that its impact established an equal protection violation. See TRIe,
supra note 8, at 1503.
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ance alone, without racial animus (as in de jure cases), would not consti-
tute an equal protection violation." Unsurprisingly, the doctrine of
Washington v. Davis also impacted the Court's desegregation
Jurisprudence.45
Nor were desegregation efforts confined to the South. In Keyes v.
School District No. I, 6 decided before Davis, the Court held that
because the Denver school board had deliberately segregated one section
of the school district, there was the presumption that other segregated
portions of the school district were the product of racial animus. Conse-
quently, unless the school board was able to prove that de facto segrega-
tion in the remainder of the district was not the product of discriminatory
intent, the court was free to order a system-wide remedy.47
Northern de facto segregation was addressed in Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick.48 There, the City of Columbus had had no statuto-
rily-mandated segregation in the Twentieth Century. Nevertheless, sys-
temwide relief was affirmed because "the Board's conduct at the time of
trial and before not only was animated by an unconstitutional, segrega-
tive purpose, but also had current, segregative impact that was suffi-
ciently systemwide to warrant the remedy ordered by the District
Court."49 Thus, after Keyes, Dayton II, and Penick, the intent element
demanded by Davis was partially ameliorated by the use of the "taint"
concept and inferences of intent, such as "actions having foreseeable and
anticipated disparate impact [which] are relevant evidence to prove the
ultimate fact, forbidden purposes were acceptable."50 Despite the posi-
44. Racial animus as a necessary element of an equal protection violation is facially
unexceptional. However, this requirement is troubling when one considers that Brown sought to
end educational apartheid and gave no deference to the possibility of benign purposes. See Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Further, asking
plaintiffs to prove racial animus is divisive, because it requires a charge that entire school boards
acted with racism. Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-74 (1986) (discussing the rationale
behind the amended Voting Rights Act's refusal to require racial animus as an element of minority
vote dilution). Moreover, from an evidentiary perspective, racial animus is potentially difficult to
prove.
45. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton 1) (Court
vacated systemwide remedy ordered by district court in absence of intent to segregate despite
racial imbalance and a "cumulative violation" of the equal protection clause).
46. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
47. 413 U.S. at 208. Chief Justice, then Justice, Rehnquist dissented and took the majority to
task for reading the Equal Protection Clause as "embody[ing] a principle of 'taint[.]'" Id. at 257.
See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II) (holding isolated
discriminatory acts shifted presumption to schoolboard to prove systemwide racial imbalance not
the product of racial animus). Dayton I was a companion case to Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penwick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
48. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
49. 443 U.S. at 455.
50. Id. at 464.
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tive results for the respective claimants in Keyes, Dayton II, and Penick,
students enrolled in segregated school systems were required to prove
that their segregation was the result of racial animus to gain relief.
Moreover, the future of desegregation was tenuous and dependent on the
shifting majorities of the Court. 1
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have addressed the test for
dissolving a desegregation decree. In Board of Education v. Dowell,52
the Court determined that whether unitary status had been reached
depended upon whether the district had complied with the desegregation
decree and whether the vestiges of past de jure segregation had been
eliminated to the extent practicable. 53 The next year, in Freeman v.
Pitts,54 the Court enunciated factors that a district court should address
in determining whether it should withdraw its supervision over a district.
These factors include the district's record of compliance, whether further
control is necessary to gain compliance in other areas, and whether the
district has shown a good faith commitment to the decree.55 Moreover,
both Dowell and Pitts allowed districts to adopt neutral policies after
achieving unitary status even though those policies may have a resegre-
gative effect.56 Arguably, these decisions, while true to the laudable
ideal of returning school districts to local control, may contribute to a
return to significant racial imbalance. 57
The Supreme Court has considered sound reasons for limiting the
reach of desegregation remedies-the neighborhood school policy, the
respect for district lines, the return of schools to local control-however,
it is difficult to elevate any of these factors above the right to be free of
segregation.58 Undeniably, the attenuated causal chain linking de jure
segregation to present day effects is becoming more difficult to estab-
lish, and courts' patience and ability to rectify desegregation is waning.
Unfortunately, just as the courts seem to be losing the ability to deal
with racial imbalance in education, the spectre of racial segregation in
America's public schools still looms. 59
51. See, TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1499.
52. 498 U.S. 237 (1990).
53. Id. at 249.
54. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
55. Id. at 488-89.
56. See Pitts, 503 U.S. at 485-92; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250.
57. See Note, Bradley W. Joondeph, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of
Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. Rv. 147, 160-65 (1993).
58. See TIBE, supra note 8, at 1500.
59. See Gary Orfield et al., Deepening Segregation in American Public Schools (Apr. 5,
1997) (unpublished report, Harvard Project on School Desegregation) (on file with author).
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III. MSSOURI V. JENKINS. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND
FACTS DETAILED
The origins of this case lie in a 1977 complaint brought by the
Kansas City, Missouri school district (KCMSD), the school board, and
two children of school board members alleging that the State of Mis-
souri, surrounding suburban school districts (SSD), and federal agencies
were responsible for racial segregation within the Kansas City schools.
60
After the complaint was filed, the district court realigned the KCMSD as
a defendant along with the State, and dismissed the SSDs finding that
the plaintiffs "simply failed to show that those defendants had acted in a
racially discriminatory manner that substantially caused racial segrega-
tion in another district. 61
At trial, the State of Missouri admitted that it had "mandated segre-
gated schools for black and white children. '62 Moreover, the court
found that the KCMSD and the State had failed in their affirmative
duties to dismantle the dual system of education "still lingering in the
KCMSD. '63 This finding was predicated upon the fact that in 1977, "25
one-race schools under the pre-1954 system remained 90% or more of
the same race,"' and that by 1984, twenty-four schools within the
KCMSD remained "racially isolated with 90% plus black enrollment.
65
In light of these findings, the district court recognized that improve-
ments had been made, including the elimination of the sixteen entirely
white schools, the reduction of the ninety percent-plus black schools to
twenty-eight, and that, by 1984, no school had less than thirty percent
black enrollment. 66 However, these improvements were not enough to
overcome the district court's finding that the vestiges of segregation still
existed within the KCMSD, and therefore, the State of Missouri and the
KCMSD had failed to meet their affirmative duty to effect a transition to
a unitary school system.
67
Having entered a judgment of liability against the State of Missouri
60. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (N.D. Mo. 1984).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1490. Segregation in Missouri was mandated by statute and by a provision of the
Missouri Constitution. See Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976); Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 163.130, 165.117 (repealed 1957). Missouri did not immediately abrogate its segregation
statutes following Brown L Instead, the statutes were repealed in 1957 and the constitutional
provision was rescinded in 1976. See Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
affid, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
63. Id. at 1504.
64. Id. at 1492.
65. Id. at 1493.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1504.
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and the KCMSD, the district court delayed deciding upon a remedy.
Instead, it required the defendants to submit a plan that would have "the
effect of removing the vestiges of the dual system as it presently exists
in the KCMSD. ' 68
Nine months later, the district court entered its first remedial order
seeking to eradicate "all vestiges of state imposed segregation" through
the use of "its broad equitable powers. '69 Recognizing the complexity
of the situation the district court stated:
implementation of this plan will be difficult. 'The pain of transition
is an unfortunate, but inevitable result of deliberate policies which
have isolated black Americans from the schools... of white Ameri-
cans.' Since the minority students in the KCMSD are the victims of
racial discrimination which was mandated by the Constitution and
statutes of the State of Missouri, it is only equitable to place the
greatest burden of removing the vestiges of such discrimination and
the continuing effects of the same on the State rather than on those
who are the victims.7"
Fully aware of the complexity of enforcing a desegregation remedy,
the district court began its task. Initially, the district court found that
student achievement within the schools of the KCMSD had been detri-
mentally affected by segregation, and consequently, the students in the
KCMSD were performing below national levels. 7 This conclusion was
supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Daniel Levine and Dr. Eugene
Eubanks, and by the results of the Iowa Test of Basic Skills.72 Further,
educational experts testified that the KCMSD schools could "attain edu-
cational achievement results more in keeping with national norms," pro-
vided that the KCMSD schools had adequate resources, sufficient staff
development, and proper teaching methods.73
As a result, the district court ordered quality education programs
for all students within the district to improve educational achievement
levels in the district. The district court's plan to improve education
included:
1. Returning the KCMSD to a AAA rating, as determined by the
Missouri State Department of Elementary and Secondary Education.
In order that AAA rating be attained the KCMSD must:
(a) Improve its library facilities, and hire 13 certified elementary
68. Id. at 1506.
69. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
70. Id. at 23-24 (quoting United States v. School District of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 546 (8th
Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted).





school librarians and 9 senior high librarians. The total cost of library
improvements was estimated at $950,000.
(b) Improve the teaching load and curriculum of teachers within
the KCMSD. This requirement was to be met by the hiring of 62
additional teachers including teachers in the specialty areas of art,
music, and physical education.
(c) Hire counselors to meet the requirement of 1 counselor for
every 1,500 students at the elementary school level, and 1 counselor
for every 390 students at the secondary level.74
2. Reduction in class size: limiting class size in kindergarten
through third grade to 22 students; and class size in grades four and
above to 27 students. These limitations required the hiring of 183
additional teachers. The costs allocated to achieving this goal were to
be $2,000,000 in the first year, $4,000,000 in the second year, and
$6,000,000 in the third year, totaling $12,000,000.
7 5
3. Implementation of programs which will expand educational
opportunities including: summer school; full day kindergarten; before
and after school tutoring; and an early childhood development
program.76
Further, the State was ordered to fund programs at the schools in
the KCMSD.77 Funding was mandated at both racially isolated schools
and the other schools within the district. The parameters for the funding
were:
1. For each of the 25 schools with enrollments of 90% or more
black:
a. 1985/86 school year $75,000 each school
b. 1986/87 school year $100,000 each school
c. 1987/88 school year $125,000 each school
2. For each of the remaining forty-three schools:
a. 1985/86 school year $50,000 each school
b. 1986/87 school year $75,000 each school
c. 1987/88 school year $100,000 each school.78
In addition to redressing the reduced achievement levels in the
KCMSD, the district court sought to desegregate the racially isolated
schools within the district.79 The court realized that the demographics of
the Kansas City metropolitan area would still make desegregation diffi-
cult: "[t]o accomplish desegregation within the boundary lines of a
school district whose enrollment remains 68.3% black is a difficult
74. Id. at 26-27.
75. Id. at 28-30.
76. Id. at 30-33.
77. Id. at 33-34.
78. Id. at 33.
79. See id. at 37.
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task."' Moreover, the district court recognized the limitations of its
remedial power. It could not order the restructuring of operations of
local and state government entities beyond the boundary lines of the
KCMSD because it had found only an intradistrict violation.8 ' Thus, the
court recognized that Milliken I imposed an obstacle to a desegregation
remedy affecting any school district beyond the KCMSD.
Consequently, the district court was relegated to attempting to
desegregate a school district where the majority of students were black.
Realizing that mandatory student reassignments within the district
would likely lead to white-flight, exacerbating segregation, the court
abandoned this option.8 2 Instead, the court sought to attract voluntary
transfers into the KCMSD through improving the quality of education
within the district by achieving AAA status, establishing quality educa-
tion programs, reducing class size, and creating magnet schools within
the district.83 Ultimately, the court attempted to influence racial patterns
within the KCMSD by promoting the attractiveness of the schools,
thereby increasing the desire of students, and their parents, to enroll in
the enhanced KCMSD schools. The district court also targeted capital
improvements as part of its desegregation remedy. The court concluded:
[the] deteriorating conditions of the facilities include safety and
health hazards, educational environmental impairments, functional
impairments, and appearance impairments. The problems include
extremes of heat and cold due to faulty heating systems, peeling
paint, broken windows, odors resulting from inadequate and deterio-
rating ventilation systems, improper lighting, wiring problems, inade-
quate storage, lack of appropriate space for library and resource
rooms, crumbling playground equipment installed over hard surfaces,
water damage due to roof leakage, and deterioration of steps in
school access areas.8
Stating the obvious, the court asserted that "a school facility which
presents safety and health hazards to its students and faculty members
serves both as an obstacle to education as well as to maintaining and
80. Id. at 38. In its initial decision, finding the State of Missouri liable for the segregation
within the KCMSD, the district court also found that the State had undertaken positive acts which
discriminated against blacks including: segregating schools, segregating institutions of higher
education, allowing communities to establish separate libraries, parks, and playgrounds for blacks
and whites, proscribing marriages between persons 1/8 negro and a white person, and enforcing
racially restrictive covenants. Further, the district court reasoned that these acts, having placed the
State's imprimatur upon racial discrimination, encouraged private discrimination against blacks in
the real estate, banking, and insurance industries. Thus, the State may incur liability for the
racially segregated residential patterns within metropolitan Kansas City. 593 F. Supp. at 1503.
81. Id. at 38.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 38.
84. Id. at 39-40 (citations omitted).
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attracting non-minority enrollment."85 Hence, the district court's initial
order focused on removing the vestiges of past unlawful segregation.
Specifically, it focused on improving the educational environment
within the district by improving educational programs and capital
resources, thereby, promoting the desegregation of the KCMSD by
enhancing its viability as an educational alternative in the Kansas City,
Missouri area.
Since 1985, the district court has continued to order enhancements
to the district aimed at achieving its original goal of the "elimination of
all vestiges of state imposed segregation. 86 Consequently, in 1986, the
district court approved a comprehensive magnet school program
whereby all senior high schools, all middle schools, and half of all ele-
mentary schools would be converted to magnet schools.87 The district
court stated two goals for the magnet school program. First, it would
improve the educational opportunities for students within the district,
and, second, it would attract students into the district."8 Ultimately, the
district court's orders have resulted in:
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an
alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000 square-foot planeta-
rium; green houses and vivariums; a twenty-five acre farm with an
air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United
Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and
television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature
controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500
square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875 square-foot ele-
mentary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming
pools and numerous other facilities.89
The costs of implementing the district court's orders have largely been
borne by the State.90
In 1992, the district court ordered that the State fund additional
salary increases for KCMSD instructional and noninstructional staff,9
and that it continue funding the remedial quality education programs for
the 1992/93 school year.92 The State challenged these orders contending
85. Id. at 40. The total cost of capital improvements ordered by the district court exceeds
$540,000,000. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1995).
86. Id. at 23.
87. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 2044-45 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 77 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
90. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 77 (1990) for treatment of the district court's order
compelling the local government to impose taxes to fund the improvements.
91. See District Court's Order of June 15, 1992.
92. See District Court's Order of June 17, 1992.
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that the order requiring the salary increases was beyond the district
court's remedial authority, and that it had achieved partial unitary status
regarding the quality education programs.
9 3
The district court denied the State's assertion that the salary
increases were beyond its remedial authority and found that the
increases were appropriate because "high quality personnel are neces-
sary not only to implement specialized desegregation programs intended
to 'improve educational opportunities and reduce racial isolation' ... but
also to 'ensure that there is no diminution in the quality of its regular
academic program.""' Further, the court ordered the State to continue
to fund the quality education programs for the 1992/93 school year with-
out specifically addressing the State's contention that it had reached par-
tial unitary status.95
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court.96 Regarding the salary increases, the court of appeals
rejected the State's argument that the salary increases were not directly
related to the State's constitutional violation, and that "low teachers sal-
aries did not flow from any earlier constitutional violations by the
State."97 In affirming the salary increases, the court of appeals also rec-
ognized that the remedy granted by the district court had the additional
goal of "reversing white flight by offering superior educational
opportunities." 98
Moreover, although the district court did not address this issue, the
court of appeals determined that the district court had implicitly rejected
the State's contention that it had achieved partial unitary status.99 Rely-
ing on comments made by the district court during a May 28, 1992 hear-
ing, the court of appeals determined that the district court had considered
and rejected the partial unitary status argument. The comments were:
The court's goal was to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri school
district to the maximum degree possible, and all these other matters
were elements to be used to try to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri
schools, so the goal is integration. That's the goal. And a high stan-
dard of quality education. The magnet schools, the summer school
program and all these programs are tied to that goal, and until such
time as that goal has been reached, then we have not reached the
goal.... The goal is to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri school
93. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
94. Id. at 2038.
95. Id.
96. Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 767.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 765.
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district. So I think we are wasting our time."
Thus, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that the State had
achieved partial unitary status and announced the relevant inquiry for
determining unitary status, stating that the significant factor was not
"implementation" of the programs, but rather "whether the vestiges of
segregation, here the system-wide reduction in student achievement,
have been eliminated to the greatest extent possible."10 1 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari to review
the order requiring the State to continue funding the quality education
programs and to fund salary increases.
0 2
IV. MISSOURI v. IENKINS." THE COURT'S DECISION
In Jenkins, a majority of the Court 03 held that the district court
exceeded its discretion in ordering the State to fund salary increases.' °
Initially, the Court canvassed the limitations of the district court's reme-
dial authority, namely, that "the nature of the desegregation remedy is to
be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation,"1
0 5
and that, "[the remedy] must directly address and relate to the constitu-
tional violation itself."' 0 6 Thus, the propriety of the salary orders
depended on whether they "rested upon... [a] proper means to the end
of restoring the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of that conduct."' 07
In determining whether the salary orders were proper, the Court
returned to its holding in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1),108 that "with-
out an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, their is no constitu-
tional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."'0 9 The Court then
proceeded to characterize the salary order as an illicit interdistrict rem-
edy that went beyond the district court's remedial authority "to eliminate
to the extent practicable the vestiges of prior de jure segregation within
the KCMSD: a systemwide reduction in student achievement and the
existence of twenty-five racially identifiable schools with a population
of over 90% black students."' 10
100. Id. at 761.
101. Id. at 766.
102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
103. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas comprised
the majority.
104. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
105. Id. at 2049 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
106. Id. at 2049 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 2051; see also supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
109. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
110. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (citations omitted).
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The Court based this conclusion on the purpose behind the salary
orders: enhancing the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD."'
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that by seeking to entice non-minority stu-
dents into the KCMSD through improved education, the district court
had "devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks
the authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of stu-
dents."'" 2 The Court concluded that the voluntary interdistrict transfers
expected to follow from the enhanced "desegregative attractiveness,"
were comparable to the mandatory busing of Detroit area students in
Milliken L Once satisfied that the remedy was interdistrict, the Court's
decision that it was invalid followed logically from the lower court's
decision that only an intradistrict violation had occurred.'
13
Consideration then turned to the district court's mandate that the
State continue to fund quality education programs. The district court
order required continued State funding of quality education programs
because "student achievement levels were still 'at or below national
norms at many grade levels.' "114 The State's specific challenge to this
portion of the district court's order was that "while a mandate for spe-
cific educational improvement, both in teaching and in facilities, may
have been justified originally, its indefinite extension is not."' 1 5
There were two justifications for the institution of quality education
programs in the KCMSD: First, to remedy low student achievement due
to unlawful segregation; and second, to promote the desegregative
attractiveness of the schools. Unsurprisingly, following the Court's
rejection of desegregative attractiveness as a valid predicate for increas-
ing salaries, it rejected desegregative attractiveness as a justification for
requiring continued State funding of quality education programs.1 16
No factfindings were contained in the district court's order mandat-
ing continued funding of the quality education programs. 1' 7 Troubled
by this, the Court concluded that detailed factfinding, and clear articula-
tion of these findings, was necessary to the determination of whether a
school district operating under a school desegregation order has reached
partial unitary status."' Although this deficiency was recognized by the
court of appeals, it nevertheless had affirmed the district court's order,
relying on the general assertion that the KCMSD had not achieved its
111. See id. at 2051.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.







"maximum potential because the [school] district was still at or below
national norms at many grade levels." 9
The Court, however, rejected both the generalized reasoning of the
district court and the "maximum potential" test. 20 Instead, the Court
enunciated that the relevant question the district court must consider on
remand is whether "the reduction in achievement by minority students
attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent
practicable."' 2' Further, the Court emphasized the necessity for findings
that demonstrate the incremental effect of segregation upon minority stu-
dent achievement. 1
22
Finally, the Court advised the district court to utilize the three-part
Freeman test in determining whether control of the district should be
returned to the local authorities. 2 3 Moreover, the Court recommended
that the district court consider that the State's responsibility for the qual-
ity education programs was limited to funding, rather than implementa-
tion, thus decreasing the State's responsibility for the current status of
student achievement levels."24 Ultimately, the use of student achieve-
ment levels as a factor in determining whether unitary status had been
achieved was explicitly disfavored because "numerous external factors
beyond the control of the KCMSD and the State affect minority achieve-
ment."1 25 In concluding its opinion, the majority cautioned the district
court that "its end purpose is not only to remedy the violation to the
extent practicable, but also to restore state and local authorities to the




This analysis will center on three aspects of the Court's opinion:
first, the decision to reach the underlying goal of desegregative attrac-
tiveness, second, the Court's view that desegregative attractiveness was
119. Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1993).
120. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
121. Id. (quoting Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)).
122. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
123. The test enunciated in Freeman is: (1) whether there has been full and satisfactory
compliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;
(2) whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the
decree in other facets of the school system; and (3) whether the school district has demonstrated,
to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith
commitment to the whole of the Court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the
Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance. Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992).
124. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
125. Id. at 2056.
126. Id.
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the sole goal for the salary increases, and, third, the Court's extension of
the Milliken I doctrine to the facts of this case.
A. The Majority's Decision to Reach the Merits of the Underlying
Goal of Desegregative Attractiveness
Initially, the majority and dissent disagreed regarding whether the
district court's goal of achieving desegregative attractiveness should be
reached. The majority concluded that it must reach this issue, the dis-
sent disagreed. The significance of this discord is that the majority
addressed the lower court's entire remedial scheme which spanned
decades, while the dissent, authored by Justice Souter, limited its analy-
sis to the two orders specifically challenged.
The majority concluded that the district court's "basis for its salary
order was grounded in improving the desegregative attractiveness of the
KCMSD. ' 127 Therefore, the Court decided that it must address the pro-
priety of the goal of attaining desegregative attractiveness, and, ulti-
mately, whether the district court's focus on this goal was
permissible. 28 However, the dissent disagreed, and stated that the ques-
tions presented could be answered without reaching the underlying goal
of desegregative attractiveness.
129
Rule 14.1(a) of the Supreme Court governs what issues may be
considered by the Court, and states that: "[o]nly the questions set out in
the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court." 13° The Court has held that an issue is fairly comprised in a
question presented if "the determination of the question is essential to
the correct disposition of the other issues in the case.... ,3
Obviously, this rule, as well as the cases cited by the Court constru-
ing it, is malleable. Ultimately, the Court's view of the case will deter-
mine whether it believes an issue is "essential to the correct disposition"
127. Id. at 2047.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 2076.
130. Sup. CT. R. 14.1. The text of the rule reads:
1. A petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order indicated:
(a) The questions presented for review, expressed concisely in relation to the
circumstances of the case, without unnecessary detail. The questions should be
short and should not be argumentative or repetitive .... The questions shall be set
out on the first page following the cover, and no other information may appear on
that page. The statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only questions set out in the petition, or
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.
SUp. CT. R. 14.1(a).
131. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 n.5 (1980); see also Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 n.6 (1977) (holding that the issue was included in the question
presented because it was "essential to analysis of the Court of Appeals [decision]").
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of the controversy. Here, the majority and dissent had divergent view-
points; this ultimately determined the issues that the majority and dissent
were willing to reach.
Justice Souter read the two questions accepted for certiorari as
requiring analysis of only two discreet issues:
[1] the extent to which a district court may look at students' test
scores in determining whether a school district has attained partial
unitary status as to its Milliken II educational programs, and [2]
whether the particular salary increases ordered by the District Court
constitute a permissible component of its remedy.'
32
Souter resolved that both issues could be answered without examin-
ing the magnet school concept, and that the Court, by deciding this
ancillary issue, had run afoul of Rule 14.1.' 33 Further, Justice Souter
stated that if, arguendo, the Court was correct that this issue could be
reached without offending Rule 14.1, "the critical inquiry is whether that
issue may fairly be decided without clear warning."'1
34
Justice Souter then demonstrated that both questions presented
could be answered without reaching the foundational issue. Addressing
the role of test scores in determining whether the district had achieved
partial unitary status, Souter read the findings of the district and appel-
late courts differently than the majority. He concluded that the test
scores were not dispositive in denying unitary status for the district.
35
Justice Souter cited the concurring opinion of the Eighth Circuit, deny-
ing rehearing en banc, in support of his argument: "[n]othing in this
court's opinion, the district court's opinion, or the testimony of
KCMSD's witnesses indicates that test results were the only criteria
used in denying the State's claim that its obligation for the quality edu-
cation programs should be ended by a declaration that they are
unitary."
1 36
Instead, Justice Souter reasoned that unitary status was denied
because the State did not attempt to show that they met the standards of
Freeman, and would not have satisfied the test had they attempted to do
SO. 
13 7 Indeed, Justice Souter stated that the State failed to allege compli-
132. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2077.
133. Id. at 2076. See also Procunier v. Navaratte, 434 U.S. 555, 560 n.6 (1978) (construing the
requirements of Supreme Court Rule 14.1).
134. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2077. Souter argued that because a challenge to the validity of the
entire remedial scheme had earlier been denied certiorari, the plaintiffs were without warning that
the entire remedial scheme was threatened. See id.
135. See id. at 2078.
136. Id. at 2078 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 19 F.3d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1994) (Gibson, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)).
137. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2078. Again, the Freeman test is:
(1) whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those aspects of the
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ance with two prongs of the Freeman test.138 Further, Souter deter-
mined that had the State attempted to satisfy the Freeman test, it would
have failed, because no evidence was presented on the effects of the
quality education programs as demanded by Freeman.
39
Souter declared that under both Freeman and Dowell, the initial
requirement in determining unitary status is that "to the extent reason-
ably possible, a constitutional violator must remedy the ills caused by its
actions before it can be freed of the court-ordered obligations it has
brought upon itself."' 40  Therefore, Justice Souter demanded that a
proper record be established to determine whether improvement in edu-
cation programs had cured the deficiency in the district to the extent
practicable.
1 4 1
Consequently, Justice Souter decided that the first question
presented could be decided without reaching the merits of the "magnet
school concept." Similarly, Souter determined that the second question,
challenging the order requiring salary increases, could have been
resolved without reaching the permissibility of desegregative attractive-
ness as an underlying goal for the increases.
Although the majority viewed desegregative attractiveness as the
sole goal of the salary increases, Souter found that the district court
viewed the salary increases as vital to the goal of improving student
achievement.1 42 Souter noted that the district court justified its salary
increases because of their potential to improve education within the dis-
trict: "[i]t is essential that the KCMSD have sufficient revenues to fund





Moreover, Souter argued that the 1992 salary order was beyond
question because the State agreed to further fund the salary increases in
1990, and because the 1992 order merely maintained existing salary
levels. 4 Thus, Souter was satisfied that the district court had ordered
system where supervision is to be withdrawn; (2) whether retention of judicial control is necessary
or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and (3)
whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the
once disfavored race, its good-faith commitment to the whole of the Court's decree and to those
provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the
first instance.
138. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2079.
139. See id. at 2080.
140. Id.
141. Id. Justice Souter conceded that the significance of test scores is a matter of judgment,
but stated that they must play a role in the analysis. Id. at 2081.
142. See id.
143. Missouri v. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
144. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2081. Further, Justice Souter observed that failing to maintain
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continued funding of salaries with periodic increases because it was
essential to remedy reduced achievement levels. 4 Therefore, Justice
Souter claimed that the majority was in error because it looked only to
"desegregative attractiveness" as the goal of the salary increases and
ignored the effort to promote student achievement.'
46
It is difficult to understand the Court's apparent rush to decide a
foundational issue, that arguably may not have been included in the
questions presented, without allowing the parties an opportunity to fully
brief and argue the broad issue.147 Moreover, because the Court's deci-
sion significantly expanded the reach of Milliken I, thereby limiting the
ability of courts to effect meaningful desegregation through the use of
Milliken II remedies, it is troubling that the Court would decide this
issue without allowing the parties the fullest opportunity to litigate. 4 '
B. The Court's Refusal to Recognize Salary Increases as Germane
to the District Court's Milliken 11 Remedial Scheme
The Court focused its analysis entirely on the lower court's pur-
ported goal of achieving "desegregative attractiveness."' 49 However, in
so doing the majority ignored the district court's reasoning that the sal-
ary orders were necessary to effectuate its remedial scheme. The district
court ordered salary increases beginning in 1977 to benefit the
KCMSD's academic program, stating: "it is essential that the KCMSD
have sufficient revenues to fund an operating budget which can provide
quality education, including a high quality faculty."'' 50 Thus, the salary
increases were justified as essential to the district court's remedial pro-
gram imposed to improve the quality of education within the KCMSD.
In Milliken II, the Court affirmatively approved of remedial educa-
tion programs "designed to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality
produced by the inherently unequal dual school system long maintained
by [the district].'' Similarly, here, the district court unequivocally
determined that "[s]egregation has caused a systemwide reduction in
student achievement in the schools of the KCMSD, '' 152 and ordered a
remedial program to improve student achievement. 53 Further, the dis-
the salary orders in 1992 would have caused salary levels to fall to their 1986-1987 levels,
resulting in salaries in the KCMSD being forty to fifty percent below the nationwide level. Id.
145. See id. at 2082.
146. See id. at 2082-83.
147. Justice Souter made this argument. Id. at 2078.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 2055.
150. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
151. Milliken v. Bradley, 434 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (Milliken 11).
152. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
153. See id.
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trict court explicitly recognized the need for an operating budget suffi-
cient to ensure the KCMSD with a "high quality faculty."
1 54
Justice Souter recognized that Milliken II approved the remedial
goal of addressing reduced student achievement in a previously segre-
gated district, and therefore, concluded that the relevant inquiry was
whether the salary increases were reasonably related to improving stu-
dent achievement. That argument has merit. However, the Court recog-
nized only the goal of desegregative attractiveness, stating "we conclude
that the District Court's order of salary increases, which was 'grounded
in remedying the vestiges of segregation by improving the desegregative
attractiveness of the KCMSD' is simply too far removed from an accept-
able implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally
mandated segregation."' 55 Thus, the majority's narrow focus ignored
the permissible rationale for the salary increases and instead, focused
solely on "desegregative attractiveness" as an impermissible interdistrict
remedy. This narrow focus, when combined with the expansion of the
doctrine of Milliken I, potentially threatens all Milliken II remedies
designed to eradicate vestiges of prior segregation-most importantly,
low student achievement levels.
C. The Court's Expansion of the Definition of
"Interdistrict Remedy"
The majority opinion makes its most glaring error in its characteri-
zation of the district court's remedial scheme as an interdistrict remedy.
The Court held that the district court's order approving salary increases
was "an interdistrict goal... beyond the scope of the intradistrict viola-
tion identified by the District Court"'1 6 because the order was not predi-
cated solely on redistributing students within the KCMSD, but instead
hoped to attract non-minority students from beyond the KCMSD's
boundaries.
Clearly, the district court hoped to achieve desegregation by entic-
ing the voluntary transfer of students into the KCMSD. 1 7 However, a
hoped for voluntary transfer of students into the district is not an
interdistrict remedy as contemplated by the Milliken I Court.'5 8
154. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
155. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at A-90)
(citations omitted).
156. Id. at 2051.
157. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
158. The validity of the holding of Milliken I is certainly open to debate; it eviscerated Brown
in precisely the areas where segregation was most pervasive. As a result, district courts have few
choices in attempting desegregate a district which is racially isolated. However, the Milliken I
decision is over twenty years old, therefore, questioning its validity today is of doubtful value.
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In Milliken I, the Court invalidated a district court's remedy that
attempted to redress segregation in the Detroit school system by mandat-
ing fifty-three suburban school districts to participate in the desegrega-
tion order, although none of the fifty-three suburban districts had
committed a constitutional violation.' 59 The Supreme Court held that the
district court's remedy was impermissible because "approv[al] of the
remedy ordered.., would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to
have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible
remedy."''
60
The interdistrict remedy imposed in Milliken I, however, is easily
distinguished from the remedy imposed by the district court in Missouri
v. Jenkins. In Milliken I, the district court ordered sovereign districts,
innocent of constitutional wrong, to bus students into the Detroit school
system and to accept students bused out of Detroit.16t Thus, the Court
recognized that the remedy, if approved, would have resulted in the dis-
trict court becoming the "school superintendent for the entire area" and a
"de facto legislative authority."'' 16  Professor Tribe has accurately attrib-
uted the decision to the Court's "emphasis on the significance of local
control over the operation of schools."'' 63 Furthermore, in his Milliken I
dissent, Justice White commented on the majority opinion's "talismanic
invocation of the desirability of local control over education."'"
It, therefore, becomes clear that the Milliken I Court found the
"interdistrict" remedy objectionable because it commanded local gov-
ernment entities to relinquish control of their school districts to the dis-
trict courts, although they, themselves, had committed no wrong. Yet,
the district court, in attempting to remedy the past segregation within the
KCMSD, has imposed no affirmative burdens on any district except the
KCMSD. Neither the use of a magnet school concept, nor the goal of
"desegregative attractiveness," threaten the sovereignty of any other
school district. Thus, it is implausible to equate the affirmative com-
mand of a district court to bus students across district lines with the goal
of hoping to attract non-minority students into the KCMSD. As one
commentator has observed:
By holding that the salary assistance order in Jenkins was an interdis-
However, the Court's expansive reading of Milliken I is troubling because it has the potential of
severely reducing a court's ability to address problems resulting from segregation through means
other than student transfers.
159. See supra, notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
160. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1973) (Milliken 1).
161. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973).
162. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 725.
163. TIBE, supra note 8, at 1495.
164. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 778 (White, J., dissenting).
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trict remedy, the Court misapplied the principles of Milliken L As
Gautreaux confirmed, the remedy in Milliken I was 'interdistrict'
because it placed significant affirmative obligations on 'innocent'
suburban school systems, usurping much of their legally conferred
authority; it essentially abolished the boundaries of fifty-four school
districts. By contrast, the salary assistance order in Jenkins imposed
no affirmative obligations on any other school district other than the
one in which the violation occurred, and it did not encroach on any
other school systems' autonomy. The only sense in which the salary
relief order was interdistrict was that it was partly designed to induce
some purely voluntary interdistrict effects. The court's conceptual-
ization of the term 'interdistrict remedy' in Jenkins ignored this dis-
tinction. It simply equated any contemplated interdistrict effects with
an interdistrict remedy.'
Despite the patent factual distinction between the instant case and
Milliken I, the majority applied the holding and declared that "the Dis-
trict Court has devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admit-
tedly lacks the remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict
transfer of students."'" However, this is precisely the reason that the
district court did not exceed its authority; it did not directly compel the
interdistrict transfer of students.
The best understanding of the salary relief order is not as an
interdistrict remedy but as an intradistrict remedy with potential
interdistrict effects. As such, it was virtually indistinguishable from
any other compensatory education remedy in a desegregation case.
As the Court acknowledged in the majority opinion in Jenkins, any
remedial program that improves the quality of education in a for-
merly segregated district will enhance that school district's attractive-
ness in relation to surrounding schools.' 6 7
Clearly, the Jenkins Court has significantly expanded the definition
of "interdistrict remedy" beyond the vision of Milliken I, which pro-
scribed remedies that placed affirmative obligations on independent and
innocent government bodies. Now any remedy potentially impacting an
independent government entity is vulnerable. Undoubtedly, a district
court attempting to eradicate the effects of desegregation is likely to rec-
ognize, if not explicitly hope for, potential impacts beyond district lines.
However, the rationale of Jenkins will potentially expose any Milliken H
remedial scheme, designed to improve the quality of education within a
district, to a challenge predicated on Jenkins.
165. Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins And The De Facto Abandonment of Court-
Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REv. 597, 634-35 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
166. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.




Today, forty-three years after Brown I, racial segregation is perva-
sive at a level not seen since Brown I was decided. 168 Moreover, racial
tension continues to be among America's most pressing concerns.'
69
Clearly, much work remains before the malingering effects of slavery
and segregation can be eradicated. Yet at the same time, society 7 ' and
our courts 171 seem to be losing the patience and commitment necessary
to redress the consequences of America's history of apartheid. A super-
ficial reading of Missouri v. Jenkins will likely cause little alarm for the
average American. Missouri has not practiced de jure segregation since
1957. This litigation, itself, is twenty years old and millions have been
spent transforming the KCMSD into a quality district. Most would
likely conclude that "[w]e've done all we can." However, one fact
remains: the district court found that the students in the KCMSD were
functioning below national norms because of the past segregation prac-
ticed in the KCMSD. As Justice Ginsberg observed in her dissent:
The Court stresses that the present remedial programs have been in
place for seven years. But compared to more than two centuries of
firmly entrenched official discrimination, the experience with the
desegregation remedies ordered by the District Court has been
evanescent.
In 1724, Louis XV of France issued the Code Noir, the first
slave code for the Colony of Louisiana, an area that included Mis-
souri. When Missouri entered the Union in 1821, it entered as a slave
State.
Before the Civil War, Missouri law prohibited the creation or
maintenance of schools for educating blacks: 'No person shall keep
or teach any school for the instruction of negroes or mulattos, in read-
ing or writing, in this State.
Beginning in 1865, Missouri passed a series of laws requiring
separate public schools for blacks. After this Court announced its
decision in Brown, Missouri's Attorney General declared these provi-
sions mandating segregated schools unenforceable. The statutes were
repealed in 1957 and the constitutional provision was rescinded in
1976. Nonetheless, thirty years after Brown, the District Court found
168. See Orfield, supra note 59.
169. See Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded By Color: The New Equal Protection, The Second
Deconstruction, And Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1997) (cataloging
recent newspaper quotations bemoaning the state of race relations in America).
170. See, e.g., Cal. Prop. 209. This affirmative action initiative amended the California
Constitution, prohibiting the state, municipalities, and public schools and colleges from
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the areas of
employment, public education, or public contracting. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (amended
1996).
171. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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that the 'inferior education indigenous of the state-compelled dual
school system has lingering effects in the Kansas City, Missouri
School District.' 
172
In essence, the students of the KCMSD are left with no remedy to
combat the lingering effects of Missouri's history of segregation. Even
more disturbing, the Court's decision has constrained the ability of dis-
trict courts to impose Milliken II remedies in an era where such remedies
may be the only means of equalizing the education received in
America's schools.
JAMES ANTHONY BEN
172. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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